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Abstract
This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in
vertically related markets. We show that (i) regardless of the nature of goods, choosing Bertrand
competition is the dominant strategy for downstream firms, which leads downstream firms to face a
prisoners’ dilemma; (ii) the optimal export intervention can be a subsidy under Bertrand competi-
tion; and (iii) when the choice of competition mode is delegated to upstream firms or to the upstream
firm on country and the downstream firm in the other country, multiple equilibria (quantity-price
and price-quantity competitions) can be sustained except those for which goods are sufficiently
close complements. With the exception of such a case, Bertrand competition can be sustained
with this delegation of competition mode choice. Thus, a conflict of interest between downstream
and upstream firms may or may not occur, as social welfare depends on who chooses the competi-
tion mode and the degree of imperfect complementarity. This contrasts with the result under free
trade, which shows that there is no conflict of interests between upstream and downstream firms
with Cournot (Bertrand) competition when the goods are substitutes (complements) in equilibrium.
JEL Classification: F12, F13, L13.
Keywords: Choice of Cournot and Bertrand, Subsidy, Vertical Structure, Delegation, Welfare.
1 Introduction
The theory of a strategic trade policy has progressed remarkably in terms of the game theoretical
approach in the 1980s. Adopting a two-stage game, a pioneering work by Brander and Spencer
(1985) revealed that strategic export subsidization may enhance the exporting country’s welfare under
Cournot competition in the third market; the rent-shifting effect of the strategic subsidy can be
explained by the firms’ distorted objective functions1. On the other hand, Eaton and Grossman
(1986) showed that strategic export taxation is optimal under Bertrand competition.
Based on both Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), Spencer and Jones
(1992) investigated whether an import tariff on an intermediate input may reduce the input price
under a vertically integrated structure model. Recently, many papers attempt to explain the vertical
structure with the strategic trade policy. For example, Bernhofen (1997) showed that a downstream
country’s optimal policy calls for a tax or a subsidy depending on whether or not the upstream firm
charges a discriminating or uniform price. Moreover, this approach has been refined by Ishikawa and
Lee (1997), Ziss (1997), Ishikawa and Spencer (1999) and Kawabata (2010), among others, to examine
the impacts of vertically related markets on strategic trade policies2. The existing literature, however,
has been paid little attention to discuss the endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or
†Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Busandaehak-ro 63 beon-gil 2, Geumjeong-gu,
Pusan 609-735, Republic of Korea, Tel:+82-51-510-2532, Fax:+82-51-581-7144, E-mail: choipnu@pusan.ac.kr.
‡Corresponding author. Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Busandaehak-ro 63
beon-gil 2, Geumjeong-gu, Pusan 609-735, Republic of Korea. E-mail: sylim220@gmail.com.
1For more detailed discussion of subsidy policy, see Cooper and Riezman (1989), Brainard and Martimort (1997),
Hwang and Mai (2007), and Brander (1995) and references therein.
2The vertical structure under the international trade in intermediate goods is the focus of many recent theoretical
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quantities on strategic trade policies in the presence of trade in intermediate goods. This study is a
step to fills this gap. For the purpose, we combine the model of both Brander and Spencer (1985)
and Eaton and Grossman (1986) and discuss the endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or
quantities with either subsidy or tax regime.
Since our issue was addressed in the industrial organization context, the potential impact of govern-
ment subsidy or tax policy was not theoretically incorporated. Key paper in this area includes Singh
and Vives (1984) with the endogenous choice of strategic variables. They were the first to analyze this
issue and to show, from the standpoint of consumer surplus and social welfare, that Bertrand compe-
tition is more efficient than Cournot competition regardless of the nature of goods. They also show
that when goods are substitutes, Cournot equilibrium profits are higher than Bertrand equilibrium
profits, and vice versa, when goods are complements. In the industrial organization context, many
strands of the literature have produced an array of extensions and generalizations of the analysis in
Singh and Vives (1984)3. However, none of the previous works have considered a case in which both
a domestic firm and a foreign firm choose to set prices or quantities in the vertically related markets
under what conditions government needs to help the strategic export policy4.
In contrast to the choice of strategic variables described by Singh and Vives (1984), we consider
the issue of the choice of strategic variables with strategic delegation in vertically related markets.
That is, the main issue is who should make the endogenous choice of prices or quantities under a
vertically related-international duopoly when each upstream firm sells its intermediate good to its
own country’s downstream firm. In this paper, we assume that the upstream firm in each country
prohibits its country’s downstream firm from transacting and distributing the product produced by
the rival upstream firm, and that only one downstream firm serves a given upstream firm. Thus, we
examine three cases of the delegation problem with respect to the choice of competition mode: (i)
the choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities is delegated to the downstream firm in each
country; (ii) the choice of these variables is delegated to the upstream firm in each country; (iii) the
choice of these variables is delegated to the upstream firm in one country and to the downstream firm
in the other country. Using this setting with the vertical structure, we investigate how the preference of
each firm (or government) affects social welfare. The firms’ profit can change the choice of competition
mode when the governments impose export subsidies or taxes on the final good.
The main result of our paper is that regardless of the nature of goods, even though each downstream
firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, choosing
Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the choice of competition
mode is delegated to the downstream firm in each country with strategic trade policies in a third-
country market. The intuition is as follows. The downstream firms’ profits depend on the subsidy
granted by each government and the cost charged by each upstream firm. Therefore, regardless of
the nature of goods, downstream firms produce a higher output with a lower price when choosing
and empirical studies, such as Spencer and Jones (1991), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), McLaren (2000), Grossman and
Helpman (2005), Chen et al. (2004) and Yi (2003).
3For example, Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), Hackner (2000), and Zanchettin (2006) among other reveal counter-
results based on the original framework by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand asymmetries.
4In the literature of strategic trade policies, some works with comparisons of Bertrand and Cournot competition are
Cheng (1988), Bagwell and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996) and among others, where the endogenous choice of strategic
variables is not provided, and does not consider the vertical structure.
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the price variable than when choosing the quantity variable. The upstream firms charge a higher
input price when choosing the quantity variable than when choosing the price variable. Therefore,
each downstream firm’s optimal strategy leads to a higher output and lower price under the choice
of the price variable regardless of the competition mode chosen by the rival firm. This forces both
downstream firms to be aggressive in determining their output under Bertrand competition. This
leads each firm to face a prisoners’ dilemma in equilibrium regardless of the nature of goods (except
for the case of a sufficiently high degree of imperfect complementarity). Moreover, we find that the
optimal export intervention can be a subsidy under Bertrand competition5. This contrasts with the
result in Eaton and Grossman (1986) and Clarke and Collie (2006) that, in the absence of vertical
structures, the optimal export policy is a tax under Bertrand competition.
However, when the choice of strategic variables is delegated to upstream firms or in the mixed case
(i.e., the upstream firm in one country and the downstream firm in the other country), the multiple
equilibria of the quantity-price and price-quantity competitions can be sustained unless the degree
of imperfect complementarity is sufficiently high. Each downstream firm chooses a lower quantity
under Cournot competition and a higher quantity under Bertrand competition. Understanding this
fact, the upstream firm uses its input price to increase its profit. Accordingly, the best response of
the upstream firm is to charge a higher input price in accordance with the given subsidy and the
choice of strategic variables of its country’s downstream firm. However, the upstream firm charges
a lower input price when the downstream firm chooses the quantity variable than when it chooses
the price variable, which means that selling more intermediate goods with a lower input price is the
dominant strategy than by selling fewer goods with a higher input price. However, choosing Bertrand
competition is the dominant strategy for upstream firms and for the mixed case when the degree of
imperfect complementarity is sufficiently large. As a result, a conflict of interest between downstream
and upstream firms may or may not occur depending on who chooses the competition mode and the
degree of imperfect complementarity.
These two main results imply that social welfare depends on who chooses the competition mode.
That is, social welfare when the choice of competition mode is delegated to each downstream firm
becomes the same as when there is Bertrand competition in each country. Moreover, the social
welfare gap becomes greater if the goods are substitutes when the choice is delegated to both upstream
firms or in the mixed case than when the choice is delegated to both downstream firms. In the case of
complementary goods, the largest social welfare, which the government prefers, is obtained if the choice
is delegated to both downstream firms, while a level of social welfare that is disadvantageous for the
government is obtained when the choice of competition mode is delegated to both upstream firms or
in the mixed case, with the exception of when goods are sufficiently close complements. Accordingly,
for social welfare, governments necessarily determine their policy for the optimal delegation of the
choice of the strategic variables according to such circumstances as the nature of goods and product
differentiation6. This result is in stark contrast to the result under freer trade, which shows that
5The intuition is as follows. An export subsidy on the final good increases the demand for the intermediate good,
which reduces the input price. This causes a decrease in the marginal cost faced by each downstream firm, which implies
that for our setting, the effect of an export tax that increases the final-good price is dominated by the effect of an export
subsidy.
6In our companion paper, Lim et al. (2014) considered analogous analysis under strategic trade policies in a third
market in the absence of vertical structures, which exists the conflict of interest between the downstream firms and gov-
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there is no conflict of interest between upstream and downstream firms and that choosing Cournot
(Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for downstream and upstream firms when the goods
are substitutes (complements).
2 The Model
We consider two vertically related activities in the home and foreign countries in where the upstream
and downstream sectors are modeled as in Brander and Spencer (1985) and a home and foreign final-
good firms export all of their output to a third country final-good market. Let 1 and 2 also represent
two countries, upstream and downstream firms i, i = 1, 2 belonging to country i. The inverse and
direct demands are:
pi = 1− qi − bqj , and qi = 1− b− pi + bpj
1− b2 ; i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (1)
where pi is the price, qi is the quantity, and b ∈ (−1, 1). If b > (<)0, the products are substitutes
(complements). Throughout the main part of the paper, assuming b 6= 0, we postulate that firms are
engaged in the case of substitutes. In each proposition in our paper, we show that the main results
also carry over to the case of complements.
The technology of the final-good production is simplified by assuming that one unit of the inter-
mediate good is required to produce one unit of the final good. Denote the price of the intermediate
good in each country by wi and wj , respectively. Given an input price wi for each downstream firm,
the two exporting downstream firms’ profit are as shown in the following function:
pii = (pi + si − wi)qi; i = 1, 2, (2)
where the home and foreign governments impose export subsidies or taxes si, on the final good.
On the other hand, we assume that both downstream firms purchase the intermediate goods from
its country’s supplier (i.e., upstream firm), which is located in the foreign and home countries. That
is, each upstream firm located in each country who is each supplier of the intermediate good offers an
input price wi to each downstream firm. The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows
7:
ui = (wi − c)qi. (3)
Thus, social welfare SWi is given by
SWi = ui + pii − siqi = (pi − c)qi, (4)
This study considers that each firm can make two types of binding contracts with third-market con-
sumers, as described by Singh and Vives (1984). Three cases of delegation are distinguished as
introduced in Introduction8. Specifically, a four-stage game model is used. In the first stage, either
ernments. That is, there is no delegation problem for the choice of competition mode between upstream and downstream
firms.
7We exclude the case in where two competing downstream firms through two-part tariffs (i.e., input price and fixed
fee) since we focus on the delegation problem with respect to the choice of competition mode between the upstream and
downstream firms.
8We do not extend to a bargaining problem between upstream and downstream firms in each country. More clear
extensions for the bargaining model are left to future research to develop the analysis more generally.
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upstream firm or downstream firm i simultaneously commit to choosing strategic variable, i.e., either
price or quantity, to set in the vertical structure. In the second stage, the exporting countries decide
on the optimal subsidy or tax si to maximize its welfare
9. In third stage, each upstream firm located
in each country simultaneously offers input price, wi to each downstream (home and foreign) firm.
In the fourth stage, each downstream firm chooses its quantity or price simultaneously, in order to
maximize its objective knowledge of the strategic variable.
3 The Choice of Competition Mode under Free Trade
We briefly present the choice of endogenous strategic variables under free trade. As stated in the
Introduction, the model and results differ from those of industrial organization since we consider two
vertically related activities in the home and foreign countries in which the downstream and upstream
sectors are modeled.
First, since we are considering the case of the free trade regime, we set s1 = s2 = 0. The profits
for downstream firm i are given by piCi = (1− bqj − qi − wi)qi, and piBi = [(pi − wi)(1− b− wi − pi +
bpj)]/(1 − b2), i = 1, 2, where superscript C (B) denotes Cournot (Bertrand) competition. At stage
four, downstream firm i’s best response functions under Cournot and Bertrand competition are given
by BRCi (qj , wi, si = sj = 0) = (1−bqj−wi)/2 and BRBi (pj , wi, si = sj = 0) = (1−b+bpj+wi)/2. Thus,
it is straightforward that the equilibrium downstream firm i’s profit is derived under each competition
mode: piCi =
(2−b−2wi+bwj)2
(4−b2)2 and pi
B
i = [2−b−b2−wi(2−b2)+bwj ]2/(1−b2)(4−b2)2. As third stage, the
upstream firm simultaneously offers input price wi to downstream firm. The profit for upstream firm i
under Bertrand competition is given by uCi = (wi−c)qi and uBi = (wi−c)(1−b−pi+bpj)1−b2 , which yields that
upstream firm i’s best response function is given by BRCi (wj , si = sj = 0) = (2− b+ 2c+ bwj)/4 and
BRBi (wj , si = sj = 0) = [2− b− b2 + c(2− b2) + bwj ]/2(2− b2). Note that we distinguish the ultimate
equilibrium values by using notation “∧” to signify the equilibrium outcomes under free trade, and we
use a notation 1−c ≡ µ. From the maximization problem, we obtain the equilibrium values as follows:
Lemma 1: Suppose that the goods under Cournot and Bertrand competition for free trade, are substi-
tutes. Then, if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s downstream firm, the equilibrium
output, the input price, the price of the final product, the upstream and downstream firms’ profits, and
9In the games considered so far, exporting firms are assumed to choose a strategic variable before exporting countries
(i.e., governments). Such moving firms first before governments in the literature of strategic trade policy is Brander and
Spencer (1987), Blonigen and Ohno (1998), Konishi et al. (1999), among others. If we switch stage one and stage two,
governments have incentive to lead firms to choose the strategic variable in the sense from the welfare viewpoint. That
is, governments do not necessarily set the optimal tax or subsidy in some case. For example, when a government wants
to induce Cournot competition, it may commit providing the optimal subsidy if the firm chooses quantity as a strategic
variable but impose an extremely high tax if the firm chooses price as a strategic variable.
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social welfare are given, respectively, by
qˆCi =
2µ
(4− b)(2 + b) , wˆ
C
i = c+
(2− b)µ
4− b , pˆ
C
i = c+
(6− b2)µ
(2 + b)(4− b) , uˆ
C
i =
2(2− b)µ2
(2 + b)(4− b)2 ,
pˆiCi =
4µ2
(2 + b)2(4− b)2 ,
ˆSW
C
i =
2(6− b2)µ2
(2 + b)2(4− b)2 , qˆ
B
i =
(2− b2)µ
(1 + b)(2− b)(4− b− 2b2) ,
wˆBi = c+
(2− b− b2)µ
4− b− 2b2 , pˆ
B
i = c+
2(1− b)(3− b2)µ
(2− b)(4− b− 2b2) , uˆ
B
i =
(1− b)(2 + b)(2− b2)µ2
(1 + b)(2− b)(4− b− 2b2)2 ,
pˆiBi =
(1− b)(2− b2)2µ2
(1 + b)(2− b)2(4− b− 2b2)2 ,
ˆSW
B
i =
2(1− b)(2− b2)(3− b2)µ2
(1 + b)(2− b)2(4− b− 2b2)2 .
Lemma 1 suggests that since input prices under Cournot and Bertrand competition are strategic
complements from BRCi (wj , si = sj = 0) and BR
B
i (wj , si = sj = 0), each upstream firm i sets the
input price to be above its marginal cost, which stems from the so called double-marginalization
problem. Thus, each downstream firm i sets the final-good price to be above its marginal cost, which
enhancing each upstream firm’s profit. Moreover, note that under free trade, there are no subsidies
under Cournot and Bertrand competition, so government i’s payoff is the same as the combined profits
of the upstream and downstream firms.
To find endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities, we need to consider the
case of which implies that the firm i optimally choose its quantity as a best response to any price
chosen by firm j, and the firm j optimally choose its price as a best response to any quantity chosen
by firm i (hereafter we call this “asymmetric competition”). Both demand functions that firms i and
j face are given by pi = 1− b+ bpj − (1− b2)qi and qj = 1− bqi − pj , respectively. Let us denote firm
i’s (j’s) equilibrium values with superscript “Q(P )” when firm i (j) sets quantity (price) as a best
response to any price (quantity) chosen by firm j(i). By using same process as before, straightforward
computation yields the following equilibrium values (straightforward calculations are in Appendix A):
Lemma 2: Suppose that the goods under asymmetric competition for free trade, are substitutes. Then,
if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s downstream firm, the equilibrium output,
the input price, the price of the final product, the upstream and downstream firms’ profits, and social
welfare are given, respectively, by
qˆQi =
2µ(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) , wˆ
Q
i = c+
(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)µ
16− 9b2 , uˆ
Q
i =
2(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)2µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
pˆQi = c+
(48− 12b− 70b2 + 16b3 + 25b4 − 5b5)µ
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) , pˆi
Q
i =
4(1− b2)(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)2µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
ˆSW
Q
i =
2(6− 5b2)(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)2µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 , pˆ
P
j = c+
(48− 12b− 62b2 + 8b3 + 20b4)µ
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) ,
wˆPj = c+
(8− 2b− 5b2)µ
16− 9b2 , qˆ
P
j =
(2− b2)(8− 2b− 5b2)µ
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) uˆ
P
j =
(2− b2)(8− 2b− 5b2)µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
pˆiPj =
(2− b2)2(8− 2b− 5b2)2µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
ˆSW
P
j =
2(2− b2)(3− 2b2)(8− 2b− 5b2)2µ2
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 .
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It is straightforward to verify that under free trade, choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the
best downstream and upstream firms can do, which is government i’s payoff is the same, when the
goods are substitutes (complements). The following proposition can be stated (straightforward calcu-
lations are in Appendix A).
Proposition 1: Suppose that under free trade in a vertically related market, a home and a foreign
firm both export to a third-country market. Then, if the choice of competition mode is delegated to
either upstream firms or downstream firms, choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant
strategy for both downstream and upstream firms when the goods are substitutes (complements). Thus,
regardless of the nature of goods except for the case of b ∈ [0.81, 1), the interests of the downstream
and upstream firms always coincide with the aspects of social welfare.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Under free trade, there are no subsidies or taxes, so government i’s payoff is the same as the combined
profits of the upstream and downstream firms. Therefore, it is straightforward to verify that under
free trade, welfare is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition regardless of the
nature of goods in the case of b ∈ (−1, 0.8] and b 6= 0. On the other hand, if b falls into range
of b ∈ [0.81, 1), welfare is larger in Cournot competition than in Bertrand competition. That is, the
upstream firm recognizes the strategic variable of the downstream firm as a means by which to increase
its profit. When the downstream firms compete with each other under Bertrand competition, each
downstream firm chooses a higher quantity, but a lower market price, which results in a lower input
price. From the viewpoint of social welfare, it is desirable to force the downstream firm to pursue
more profit under Bertrand competition than to force the upstream firm to pursue more profit in the
case of b ∈ (−1, 0.8] and b 6= 0, while this effect is reversed when b falls into range of b ∈ [0.81, 1)
under Cournot competition. In the end, social welfare faces a trade-off between Bertrand competition
and Cournot competition when product differentiation increases in the range of b ∈ [0.81, 1).
4 Equilibrium Outcomes under the Subsidy Regime
Before the type of contract is applied under subsidy regime in the international model to identify the
point of equilibrium, four different cases of contract games are explained. In Bertrand competition,
firms set prices, whereas in Cournot competition, firms set quantities. In asymmetric cases, firm i sets
the quantity and firm j sets the price and vice versa. Such a game is solved by backward induction,
i.e., the solution concept used is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE).
[Cournot Competition]: At stage four, taking arbitrary subsidy rates (s1, s2) and using inverse
demand functions, pi = 1 − qi − bqj , we obtain that the downstream firm i’s best response function
under Cournot competition is given by BRi(qj , si, wi) = (1 − bqj + si − wi)/2, which is downward-
sloping. Thus, it is straightforward that the equilibrium downstream firm i’s profit is derived at stage
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three: piCi =
(2−b+2si−bsj−2wi+bwj)2
(4−b2)2 . At the third stage, each upstream firm offers the input price wi to
each downstream firm. The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows: maxwi u
C
i = (wi−c)qi.
Hence, the upstream firm i’s best response function is given by wi = (2− b+ 2c+ 2si − bsj + bwj)/4.
Solving the system of response functions, we obtain input price, price and quantity under Cournot
competition:
wCi = c+
(8− 2b− b2)µ+ si(8− b2)− 2b3sj
16− b2 , q
C
i =
2(8− 2b− b2)µ+ si(8− b2)− 2bsj
64− 20b2 + b4 ,
pCi = c+
(48− 12b− 14b2 + 2b3 + b4)µ− 2si(8− 3b2)− 2bsj(6− b2)
64− 20b2 + b4 .
Given the output and price at third stage, each government simultaneously chooses subsidy in order
to maximize social welfare at the second stage:
max
si
SWCi =
2[α][(8− 2b− b2)µ+ (8− b2)si − 2bsj ]
(4− b2)(2− b)2(2 + b)2(4 + b)2 ,
where α = (48− 12b− 14b2 + 2b3 + b4)µ− 2si(8− 3b2)− 2bsj(6− b2).
Differentiating SWCi with respect to si, invoking symmetry (s
C
1 = s
C
2 ) and solving yields
sCi =
(32− 8b2 + b4)µ
2(16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3) > 0,
where µ = 1− c. These optimal subsidies lead to the following expression for the equilibrium values,
which summarize these results in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: Suppose that the goods under Cournot competition for subsidy regime, are substitutes.
Then, if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s downstream firm, the equilibrium
output, the input price, the price of the final product, the upstream and downstream firms’ profits, and
social welfare are given, respectively, by
qCi =
(8− b2)µ
16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3 , w
C
i = c+
(4− b2)(8− b2)µ
2(16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3) , p
C
i = c+
(8− 3b2)µ
16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3 ,
uCi =
(4− b2)(8− b2)2µ2
2(16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3)2 , pi
C
i =
(8− b2)µ2
(16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3)2 , SW
C
i =
(8− b2)(8− 3b2)µ2
(16 + 8b− 4b2 − b3)2 .
[Bertrand Competition]: Consider that firm i faces the direct demand function as in equation
(1) with arbitrary subsidy rates (si). At stage four, firm i’s best response function under Bertrand
competition with arbitrary subsidy rates (s1, s2) is given by pi
B
i = (1− b− pi + bpj)(pi + si−wi)/(1−
b2), i = 1, 2. The downstream firm i’s best response function under Bertrand competition is given by
BRi(pj , si, wi) = (1−b+bpj−si+wi)/2. Thus, it is straightforward that the equilibrium downstream
firm i’s profit is derived at stage four: piBi =
[(2+b)(1−b)+(2−b2)(si−wi)−b(sj−wj)]2
(1−b2)(4−b2)2 .
As regards the third stage, each upstream firm offers an input price wi to each downstream firm.
The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows: maxwi u
B
i = (wi− c)qi. Hence, the upstream
firm i’s best response function under Bertrand competition is given by wi = [2− b− b2 + c(2− b2) +
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si(2− b2)− bsj + bwj ]/2(2− b2). Solving the system of response function, we obtain price and quantity
under Bertrand competition:
wi = c+
Aµ+ siB − bsj(2− b2)
16− 17b2 + 4b4 , pi = c+
Cµ− si(16− 14b2 + 3b4)− sj(12− 10b2 + 2b4)
64− 84b2 + 33b4 − 4b6 ,
qi =
(2− b2)[Aµ+ siB − bsj(2− b2)]
64− 148b2 + 117b4 − 37b6 + 4b8 , where A = (8− 2b− 9b
2 + b3 + 2b4), B = (8− 9b2 + 2b4),
and C = (48− 12b− 70b2 + 10b3 + 30b4 − 2b5 − 4b6).
Given the output and the price at the third stage, each government simultaneously chooses to
subsidy in order to maximize social welfare at the second stage
max
si
SWBi =
(2− b2)[β][(8− 2b− 9b2 + b3 + 2b4)µ+ si(8− 9b2 + 2b4)− bsj(2− b2)]
(1− b2)(64− 84b2 + 33b4 − 4b6)2 ,
where β = (48− 12b− 70b2 + 10b3 + 30b4 − 2b5 − 4b6)µ− si(16− 14b2 + 3b4)− bsj(12− 10b2 + 2b4).
Differentiating SWBi with respect to si, invoking symmetry (s
B
1 = s
B
2 ) and solving yields
sBi =
(1− b)(32− 56b2 + 27b4 − 4b6)µ
(2− b2)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4) .
Note that if b ∈ (0.97, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.97)10, then sBi becomes a negative value that is related to
the export tax, as analyzed in Eaton and Grossman (1986). However, in contrast to the result of
Eaton and Grossman (1986), around the range of b, the optimal subsidy is positive instead of the
optimal tax. The negative value sBi when b ∈ (0.97, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.97) implies that governments
want to tax under Bertrand competition if and only if each competition is sufficiently severe or mild
in the product market between downstream firms. It is desirable to force the downstream firm to set
a higher price by imposing an export tax when b ∈ (0.97, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.97), while it is desirable
to force the downstream firm to increase more its output by imposing an export subsidy even under
Bertrand competition as long as b falls into the range b ∈ (−0.97, 0.97). The intuition for this result
can be explained as follows. An export subsidy of the final good increases the demand for the inter-
mediate good, which reduces the input price. This causes a decrease in the marginal cost faced by
each downstream firm, which leads the best response function to be inward under Bertrand compe-
tition. These optimal subsidies lead to the following expression for the equilibrium values in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: Suppose that the goods under Bertrand competition for the subsidy regime are substitutes.
Then, if the upstream firm offers input price wi to its country’s downstream firm, the equilibrium
output, the input price, the price of the final product, the upstream and downstream firms’ profits, and
social welfare are given, respectively, by
qBi =
(8− 9b2 + 2b4)µ
(1 + b)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4) , w
B
i = c+
(1− b)(32− 44b2 + 17b4 − 2b6)µ
(2− b2)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4) ,
pBi = c+
(1− b)(8− 3b2)µ
16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4 , u
B
i =
(1− b)(4− b2)(8− 9b2 + 2b4)2µ2
(1 + b)(2− b2)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4)2 ,
piBi =
(1− b)(8− 9b2 + 2b4)2µ2
(1 + b)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4)2 , SW
B
i =
(1− b)(8− 3b2)(8− 9b2 + 2b4)µ2
(1 + b)(16− 8b− 12b2 + 3b3 + 2b4)2 .
10See Tables A-2 and A-3 in Appendix B for numerical examples.
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[Asymmetric Competition]: Let firm i optimally choose its quantity as a best response to any
price chosen by firm j, and let the firm j optimally choose its price as a best response to any quantity
chosen by firm i. Both demand functions that firms i and j face are given by pi = 1−b+bpj−(1−b2)qi
and qj = 1 − bqi − pj , respectively. Let us denote firm i’s (j’s) equilibrium values with superscript
“Q(P )” when firm i (j) sets quantity (price) as a best response to any price (quantity) chosen by firm
j(i).
At stage four, taking arbitrary subsidy rates, (s1, s2) and input price (w1, w2), we obtain that the
each firm’s best response function under asymmetric competition is given by BRi(pj , si, wi) = (1−b+
bpj + si−wi)/2(1− b2) and BRj(qi, si, sj) = (1− bqi− sj +wj)/2, which are upward- and downward-
sloping, respectively. As regards the third stage, each upstream firm offers an input price wi to each
downstream firm. The upstream firm’s maximization problem is as follows: maxwi u
Q
i = (wi−c)qi and
maxwj u
P
j = (wj−c)qj . Hence, the upstream firm i’s and j’s best response functions under asymmetric
competition are given by wi = (2− b+ 2c+ 2si− bsj + bwj)/4, and wj = (2− b− b2 + 2c− b2c+ 2sj −
b2sj − bsi + bwi)/2(2 − b2). Solving the system of response function, we obtain price and quantity
under asymmetric competition:
wi = c+
(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)µ+ si(8− 5b2)− bsj(2− b2)
16− 9b2 , wj = c+
(8− 2b− 5b2)µ− 2bsi + sj(8− 5b2)
16− 9b2 ,
pi = c+
(48− 12b− 70b2 + 16b3 + 25b4 − 5b5)µ− si(16− 14b2 + 2b4)− bsj(12− 16b2 + 5b4)
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) ,
pj = c+
(48− 12b− 62b2 + 8b3 + 20b4)µ− sj(16− 22b2 + 7b4)− bsi(12− 8b2)
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) ,
qi =
2[µ(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3) + si(8− 5b2)− bsj(2− b2)]
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) , qj =
(2− b2)[µ(8− 2b− 5b2) + sj(8− 5b2)− 2bsi]
(16− 9b2)(4− 3b2) .
Given the output and the price at the third stage, each government simultaneously chooses to
subsidy in order to maximize social welfare at the second stage
max
si
SWQi =
2[γ][µ(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3) + si(8− 5b2)− bsj(2− b2)]
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
where γ = (48− 12b− 70b2 + 16b3 + 25b4 − 5b5)µ− si(16− 14b2 + 2b4)− bsj(12− 16b2 + 5b4),
max
sj
SWPj =
(2− b2)[δ][µ(8− 2b− 5b2) + sj(8− 5b2)− 2bsi]
(16− 9b2)2(4− 3b2)2 ,
where δ = (48− 12b− 62b2 + 8b3 + 20b4)µ− sj(16− 22b2 + 7b4)− bsi(12− 8b2).
The first-order conditions for each government given by
si =
(32− 56b2 + 23b4)[µ(8− 2b− 5b2 + b3)− bsj(2− b2)]
4(8− 5b2)(8− 7b2 + b4) ,
sj =
(32− 40b2 + 13b4)[µ(8− 2b− 5b2)− 2bsi]
2(2− b2)(8− 5b2)(8− 7b2) .
Hence, straightforward calculation yields
sQi =
(16− 8b− 12b2 + 5b3)(32− 56b2 + 23b4)µ
2(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6) ,
sPj =
(16− 8b− 12b2 + 5b3 + b4)(32− 40b2 + 13b4)µ
(2− b2)(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6) > 0.
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Note that if b ∈ (0.96, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.96), then sQi has a negative value (see Tables A-2 and A-3
in Appendix B for numerical examples). The negative value sQi when b ∈ (0.96, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.96)
implies that governments want to tax when the downstream firms use quantity strategies if and only if
the competition between downstream firms is sufficiently severe or not severe in the product market.
However, governments want to subsidize when the downstream firms use price strategies. It is desirable
to force the downstream firm to set a lower price by imposing an export subsidy when downstream
firm j optimally chooses its price as a best response to any quantity chosen by downstream firm i as
long as b falls into the range b ∈ (−0.96, 0.96), while it is desirable to force the downstream firm to
produce less output by imposing an export tax if b ∈ (0.96, 1) or b ∈ (−1,−0.96). The intuition is as
follows. An export subsidy of the final good increases the demand for the intermediate good when the
rival downstream firm chooses the price strategy, which reduces the input price, while an export tax
has the reverse effect when the rival downstream firm chooses the price strategy. This implies that
depending on the degree of imperfect complementarity or substitutability, the effect of an export tax
that increases the input price is dominated by the effect of the export subsidy, and vice versa. Thus,
these optimal subsidies lead to the following expression for the equilibrium values in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: Suppose that the goods under asymmetric competition for the subsidy regime are substi-
tutes. Then, if the upstream firm offers input price wi to its country’s downstream firm, the equilibrium
output, the input price, the price of the final product, the upstream and downstream firms’ profits, and
social welfare are given, respectively, by
qQi =
(8− 5b2)ζµ
256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6 , u
Q
i =
(4− 3b2)(8− 5b2)2ζ2µ2
2(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 ,
piQi =
(1− b2)(8− 5b2)2ζ2µ2
(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 , SW
Q
i =
(8− 5b2)(8− 7b2 + b4)ζ2µ2
(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 ,
wQi = c+
(512− 256b− 1088b2 + 512b3 + 768b4 − 340b5 − 180b6 + 75b7)µ
2(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6) ,
pQi = c+
(128− 64b− 208b2 + 96b3 + 100b4 − 43b5 − 12b6 + 5b7)µ
256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6 , where ζ = (16− 8b− 12b
2 + 5b3),
qPj =
(8− 5b2)ηµ
256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6 , u
P
j =
(4− 3b2)(8− 5b2)2η2µ2
(2− b2)(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 ,
piPj =
(8− 5b2)2η2µ2
(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 , SW
P
j =
(8− 5b2)(8− 7b2)η2µ2
(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6)2 ,
wPj = c+
(512− 256b− 1088b2 + 512b3 + 800b4 − 340b5 − 224b6 + 75b7 + 15b8)µ
(2− b2)(256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6) ,
pPj = c+
(128− 64b− 208b2 + 96b3 + 92b4 − 35b5 − 7b6)µ
256− 448b2 + 240b4 − 37b6 , where η = (16− 8b− 12b
2 + 5b3 + b4).
5 The Choice of Competition Mode under the Subsidy Regime
Once the equilibria for the four fixed types of contract and social-welfare levels are derived as discussed
in the preceding section, the type of contract can be determined endogenously by taking each social
welfare level and firm’s profit as given. Therefore, we will consider the cases of substitutes and
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complements simultaneously.
To employ the four-stage game, let “C” and “B” represent, respectively, Cournot and Bertrand
competition with regard to each firm’s choice. In this section of firm’s choice of competition mode
under subsidy regime, the SPNE will be found in the first stage for any given pair of competition
types. Suppose that the choice of competition mode is delegated to downstream firm in each country.
Thus, the payoff matrix for the competition mode between downstream firms can be represented by
the following Table 1.
Table 1: The Downstream Firm’s Choice of Competition Mode under Subsidy Regime
i \ j C B
C piCi , pi
C
j pi
Q
i , pi
P
j
B piPi , pi
Q
j pi
B
i , pi
B
j
Comparing each downstream firm’s profit shows that
piCi − piPi = −b4(A)(128− 96b2 − 8b3 + 8b4 + 5b5)µ2 < 0,
where A = 4096− 7680b2 + 4864b4 − 1168b6 − 8b8 + 5b9,
piQi − piBi = −b4(B)(1− b)(128− 224b2 − 8b3 + 128b4 + 5b5 − 24b6)µ2 < 0,
where B = 4096− 11776b2 + 12800b4 − 6480b6 + 8b7 + 1498b8 − 5b9 − 124b10.
Hence, choosing Bertrand competition is the firm’s best option regardless of whether the goods are
substitutes or complements. The following proposition can then be stated.
Proposition 2: Suppose that a home firm and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market
under either the subsidy or tax regime. Then, if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s
downstream firm, choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms
regardless of the nature of the goods.
Noting that sBi and s
Q
i can have positive values depending on the degree of product differentiation,
Proposition 1 suggests that an export subsidy can be used under Bertrand competition and that
choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms regardless of the
nature of goods. The intuition is as follows. Regardless of the nature of goods, downstream firms
produce a higher output with a lower price when they choose the price variable than when they choose
the quantity variable (i.e., qPi > q
B
i > q
C
i > q
Q
i and p
C
i > p
Q
i > p
P
i > p
B
i ). Therefore, downstream
firms’ profits depend on how much subsidy is granted by each government and how much cost is
charged by each upstream firm. Each upstream firm charges a higher input price when it chooses the
quantity variable than when it chooses the price variable (i.e., wCi > w
P
i and w
Q
i > w
B
i ). Therefore,
downstream firms can predict their own optimal strategy to maximize their profit when they choose
the competition mode. The downstream firm receives a smaller subsidy when it chooses the quantity
variable than when it chooses the price variable, sCi < s
P
i , which leads to a higher output and a
lower price (i.e., qCi < q
P
i and p
P
i < p
C
i ). A higher export subsidy forces both downstream firms
to be aggressive in determining the output with wCi > w
P
i . This is because the aggressive effect in
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determining the output with a larger subsidy dominates the defensive effect in determining the output
with a smaller subsidy. On the other hand, when comparing piBi and pi
Q
i , if b ∈ (0, 0.93), then sBi < sQi
with qQi < q
B
i . The effect of a higher subsidy for the downstream firm causes a higher price for
intermediate goods, which gives rise to a high cost (i.e., wQi > w
B
i ). That is, the downstream firm has
a lower final output price, but a higher output. Therefore, the downstream firm gains higher profits
with a smaller subsidy and a lower cost when it chooses the price variable than when it chooses the
quantity variable. In other words, even if sQi < s
B
i when b ∈ (0.93, 1), this effect also leads to a higher
output and a lower price, so the downstream firm gains higher profits with a higher subsidy or tax
and a lower cost when it chooses the price variable than it chooses the quantity variable. Thus, each
firm prefers price variable to the quantity variable regardless of the nature of goods. Hence, our result
differs from that of Singh and Vives (1984), who showed that a dominant strategy exists for both firms
that choose Cournot (Bertrand) competition if the goods are substitutes (complements).
Moreover, from the relationships, piQi < pi
B
i < pi
C
i < pi
P
i (except for the case of b ∈ (−1,−0.99])11
under the subsidy regime, we understand that even though each downstream firm can earn higher
profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, choosing Bertrand competition
is a dominant strategy for both downstream firms. Consequently, for both downstream firms, the
endogenous choice of a contract might be Pareto inferior regardless of the nature of goods except for
the case of b ∈ (−1,−0.99]. Hence, each downstream firm faces a prisoners’ dilemma regardless of
the nature of goods under the subsidy regime in the vertical structure. This observation leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that a home firm and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market
under either the subsidy or tax regime. Then, if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s
downstream firm, except in case of b ∈ (−1,−0.99], each downstream firm faces a prisoners’ dilemma
regardless of the nature of goods in the vertical structure.
Proposition 3 suggests that even though each firm could obtain higher profit by choosing Cournot
competition, the endogenous choice of the strategic variable is Bertrand competition regardless of the
nature of goods. The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. By straightforward comparisons,
we obtain qCi < q
B
i ⇔ pBi < pCi ⇔ piBi < piCi except for the case of b ∈ (−1,−0.99]. This implies that
the effect on a higher price with a lower output under Cournot competition dominates the effect on a
lower price with a higher output under Bertrand competition. Note that in the range b ∈ (−1,−0.99],
the dominant strategy equilibrium is Pareto superior to the others for downstream firms since (with
complements) Bertrand profits are larger than Cournot profits.
Next, we investigate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the other case, namely, when
the choice of competition mode is delegated to the upstream firm in each country. Before the type
of contract is applied in the model to identify the point of equilibrium, we provide the relationships
between the upstream firms in the four cases as follows:
Lemma 6: Suppose that a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market under either
11See Table A-4 in Appendix B for numerical examples.
13
the subsidy or tax regime. Then, if the upstream firm offers an input price to its country’s downstream
firm,
uPi > u
C
i > u
Q
i > u
B
i (u
P
i > u
C
i > u
B
i > u
Q
i ) if b ∈ (0,−0.74)(b ∈ (−0.75,−0.97)),
uPi > u
B
i > u
C
i > u
Q
i (u
B
i > u
P
i > u
C
i > u
Q
i ) if b = −0.98(b ∈ (−0.99,−1)),
when the goods are complements. On the other hand, we obtain that uPi > u
C
i > u
Q
i > u
B
i when the
goods are substitutes.
Proof: See the Appendix B for numerical examples. 
Similar to the choice of strategic variables among downstream firms, the choice of strategic variables
among upstream firms can be represented by the following Table 2.
Table 2: The Upstream Firm’s Choice of Competition Mode under Subsidy Regime
i \ j C B
C uCi , u
C
j u
Q
i , u
P
j
B uPi , u
Q
j u
B
i , u
B
j
Using Lemma 6 and Tables A-5 and A-6 in Appendix B, which show numerical examples, we summa-
rize these results in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Suppose that a home firm and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market
under either the subsidy or tax regime. Then, if the choice of competition mode is delegated to up-
stream firms, multiple SPNEs with the range b ∈ (−0.75, 1) can be sustained regardless of the nature
of goods, whether (B, C) or (C, B). On the other hand, a unique SPNE under the subsidy regime can
be sustained with (B, B) when the goods are complements with the range b ∈ (−1,−0.75].
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is as follows. The output level of the downstream firm is determined
by its strategic variable and the subsidy granted by its government. That is, the downstream firms
choose a lower quantity when competing with each other under Cournot competition, and but choose a
higher quantity under Bertrand competition. Knowing this fact, each upstream firm uses its input price
to increase its profit. Accordingly, the best strategy for the upstream firm is to charge a higher input
price in accordance with the given subsidy and the choice of strategic variables of its downstream firm.
That is, when each downstream firm receives a higher subsidy from its government, the corresponding
upstream firm charges a higher input price, namely, sPi > s
C
i > s
Q
i > s
B
i if b ∈ (0, 0.93), sPi > sCi >
sBi > s
Q
i if b ∈ (0.93, 1), and wCi > wPi > wQi > wBi . However, the upstream charges a lower input
price when the downstream firm chooses the quantity variable than when it chooses the price variable,
which means that profit increases by selling more intermediate goods with a lower input price is the
dominant strategy rather than selling a lower level of output with a higher input price. This results
in uPi > u
C
i > u
Q
i > u
B
i .
A conflict of interest between downstream and upstream firms can occur regardless of the nature
of goods, while the degree of imperfect complementarity falls into the range b ∈ (−1,−0.75] when
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the goods are complements under the subsidy regime. The conflict of interest between them is then
resolved by choosing (B, B). Thus, the greater the degree of imperfect complementarity is, the higher
the upstream firms’ profit becomes when they choose the price strategy12. That is, if the degree
of imperfect complementarity falls into the range b ∈ (−1,−0.75], the greater the degree of imper-
fect complementarity is, the higher the upstream firm’s profit becomes under the subsidy regime in
Bertrand competition.
Given Propositions 2, 3, and 4, we show in Table 3 the results when the choice of the strategic
variables (prices or quantities) is delegated to an upstream firm in one country and to a downstream
firm in other country (hereafter, we call this the mixed delegation case).
Table 3: The Mixed Choice of Competition Mode under Subsidy Regime
i \ j C B
C uCi , pi
C
j u
Q
i , pi
P
j
B uPi , pi
Q
j u
B
i , pi
B
j
Thus, we obtain Proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Suppose that a home firm and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market
under either the subsidy or tax regime. Then, if the choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities
is delegated to the upstream firm in country i(j), and to the downstream firm in country j(i), the equi-
librium involves (C, B)[(B,C)] regardless of the nature of goods except for the case of b ∈ (−1,−0.75].
On the other hand, a unique SPNE under the subsidy regime can be sustained with (B, B) in this
range b ∈ (−1,−0.75].
Proposition 5 suggests that when the choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities has a mixed
delegation case, the government’s welfare when the choice of strategic variables is delegated to each
downstream firm is greater than when the choice of strategic variables is delegated to each upstream
firm, since SWPi > SW
Q
i when the goods are substitutes, and vice versa when the goods are comple-
ments (see Proposition 6 below).
Finally, with the endogenous choice of strategic variables and the equilibrium of subsidies or tax
levels, we are ready to assess the impacts on social welfare. By comparing the social welfare obtained
under the subsidy or tax regime in the vertical structure, we can determine the governments’ prefer-
ence orderings for the subsidy and tax regimes as follows (all calculations and numerical examples are
in Appendix B):
Proposition 6: Suppose that a home firm and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market
under either the subsidy or tax regime. Then, the government’s preference orderings for the roles are
as follows:
SWPi > SW
C
i > SW
B
i > SW
Q
i (SW
P
i > SW
C
i > SW
Q
i > SW
B
i )
12Straightforward calculations and numerical examples are in the Appendix B.
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if the goods are substitutes and b ∈ (0, 0.81)[[0.82, 1)],
SWBi > SW
Q
i > SW
P
i > SW
C
i ,
if the goods are complements.
Proposition 6 shows that social welfare depends on who chooses the competition mode. When the
choice of competition mode is delegated to each downstream firm, social welfare becomes the same in
each country with Bertrand competition. Moreover, if the goods are substitutes, the social welfare gap
widens when the choice is delegated to the upstream firms in both countries or to the mixed delegation
case compared to when the choice is delegated to both downstream firms. This implies that when the
goods are substitutes, the delegation over two upstream firms can obtain the highest welfare level if
and only if the upstream firm i sets price as a best response to any quantity chosen by upstream firm
j. Otherwise, lower or the lowest welfare level can be obtained as long as either the upstream firm or
downstream firm chooses price or quantity strategy when other firms choose the price strategy in the
three cases of the delegation problem with respect to the choice of competition mode.
In the case of complementary goods, the highest social welfare, which the government prefers, is
obtained if the choice is delegated to the downstream firms, while a disadvantageous level of social
welfare is obtained when the choice delegated to either both upstream firms or in the mixed delegation
case, except for the case in which the goods are sufficiently close complements (i.e., b ∈ (−1,−0.75), as
in Proposition 5). When the goods are complements (except for b ∈ (−1,−0.75)), this is detrimental
to welfare if the endogenous choice of the strategic variable is delegated to both upstream firms or
there is a mixed delegation case. However, with complements, it is beneficial for welfare point if the
choice of strategic variables is delegated to the downstream firms.
Consequently, Proposition 6 suggests that the downstream firms’ prisoners’ dilemma is not resolved
when the choice of competition mode is delegated to each downstream firm in the case of substitutes,
while its delegation in the case of complements is Pareto superior to the others in terms of social welfare
since the Bertrand welfare is the largest. In sum, the welfare consequences in the three delegation
scenarios differ substantially. Accordingly, for social welfare, governments necessarily set their policy
for optimally delegating the choice of the strategic variable according to such circumstances as the
nature of goods and product differentiation. This result is in stark contrast to the result under
freer trade, under which, if the choice of competition mode is delegated to either upstream firms or
downstream firms (or the mixed delegation case), choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the
dominant strategy for downstream firms, upstream firms, and the mixed delegation case when the
goods are substitutes (complements). Thus, the interests of downstream and upstream firms always
coincide with aspects of social welfare regardless of the nature of goods.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we extended the analysis of Singh and Vives (1984) by incorporating the third-
market model into strategic export policy and the delegation of the choice of strategic variables
under the vertically related-market for free trade versus the subsidy regime. Unlike the industrial
organization context, in which the choice of strategic variables is delegated to each downstream firm,
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we have suggested that regardless of the nature of goods, choosing Bertrand competition can be the
dominant strategy for downstream firms, which face a prisoners’ dilemma. However, if the choice of
competition mode is delegated to both upstream firms or if there is a mixed delegation case, a conflict
of interest between downstream and upstream firms may or may not occur depending on the degree
of imperfect complementarity. From the perspective of the government, which faces the problem of
delegating the choice of competition mode, when the goods are substitutes, the best strategy to obtain
the highest welfare level is for the two upstream firms to choose the mode if and only if one upstream
firm sets price as a best response to any quantity chosen by other upstream firm. Otherwise, lower
or the lowest welfare level can be obtained as long as either the upstream firm or downstream firm
chooses price or quantity strategy when other firms choose the price strategy in the three delegation
scenarios. However, this is not necessarily so in the case of complements.
We have used the simplifying assumption that the one home firm and the one foreign firm are sym-
metric under the vertical structure. By making this assumption, we did not take into account any cost
or demand difference that may arise from the subsidy regime. Moreover, we did not analyze strategic
outsourcing with trade liberalization in the intermediate-product market. International trade may
exist that is related to the determinants of the location of upstream activity, vertical mergers, and the
optimal domestic response of countervailing duties. Thus, we need to re-examine such relationships
from a more realistic perspective. Finally, we did not consider nonlinear demand structures. The
extension of our model in these directions is left for future research.
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Appendix A (Free Trade)
Proof of Lemma 2
As in the main text, at the third stage, taking arbitrary input price (w1, w2), we obtain that the each
downstream firm’s best response function under asymmetry competition is given by BRQi (pj , wi) =
(1−b+bpj−wi)/2(1−b2) and BRPj (qi, wj) = (1−bqi−wj)/2, which are upward- and downward-sloping,
respectively. With theseBRQi (pj , wi) andBR
P
j (qi, wj), the maximization problem of the upstream firm
yields each upstream firm’s best response function. Solving the system of response function, straight-
forward computation yields Lemma 2 as in main text. 
18
Proof of Proposition 1
To find subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we compare pˆiCi and uˆ
C
i with pˆi
P
i and uˆ
P
i , and compare pˆi
B
i
and uˆBi with pˆi
Q
i and uˆ
Q
i ;
pˆiCi − pˆiPi = b3(16− 8b− 8b2 + 5b3)(256− 336b2 − 16b3 + 116b4 + 8b5 − 5b6)µ2,
pˆiQi − pˆiBi = −b3(1− b)(16− 8b− 16b2 + 5b3 + 4b4)(256− 464b2 + 16b3 + 268b4 − 16b5 − 49b6 + 4b7)µ2,
uˆCi − uˆPi = b3(1024− 512b− 1088b2 + 512b3 + 240b4 − 130b5 + 25b6)µ2,
uˆQi − uˆBi = −b3(1024− 512b− 2112b2 + 896b3 + 1648b4 − 546b5 − 583b6 + 129b7 + 80b8 − 8b9)µ2.
Hence, Table A-1 provides the game of choice of competition mode, noting that let “C” and “B”
represent Cournot and Bertrand competition with regard to each downstream and upstream firm’s
choice.
Table A-1: The Choice of Competition Mode under Free Trade
i \ j C B
C pˆiCi , pˆi
C
j pˆi
Q
i , pˆi
P
j
B pˆiPi , pˆi
Q
j pˆi
B
i , pˆi
B
j
i \ j C B
C uˆCi , uˆ
C
j uˆ
Q
i , uˆ
P
j
B uˆPi , uˆ
Q
j uˆ
B
i , uˆ
B
j
i \ j C B
C uˆCi , pˆi
C
j uˆ
Q
i , pˆi
P
j
B uˆPi , pˆi
Q
j uˆ
B
i , pˆi
B
j
Moreover, we find that
ˆSW
B
i − ˆSW
C
i = b
2(8− 3b2)(32− 40b− 16b2 + 20b3 + 2b4 − 2b5).
Thus, when b ∈ (0, 0.81)[b ∈ (0.81, 1)], ˆSWBi > ˆSW
C
i ( ˆSW
B
i < ˆSW
C
i ). For simplicity, we omit numer-
ical examples in comparing ˆSW
B
i and
ˆSW
C
i . 
Appendix B (Subsidy Regime)
Numerical Examples
Table A-2: Numerical Examples in Subsidy sBi and s
Q
i with b ∈ (0, 1)
Substitutes
b sBi s
Q
i s
B
i − sQi
0.01 0.99492531032335 0.99492531032336 -1.54321E-14
0.1 0.94279163399473 0.94279164930704 -1.53123E-08
0.3 0.78937572627941 0.78938676515098 -1.10389E-05
...
...
...
...
0.93 0.03466519657146 0.03520207063108 -0.000536874
0.94 0.02336677361365 0.02193886748370 0.001427906
0.95 0.01315194543537 0.00900592186176 0.004146024
0.96 0.00440694809566 -0.00300349113843 0.007898087
0.97 -0.0023196601377 -0.01541279648572 0.013093136
0.98 -0.0062256575414 -0.03670727915761 0.020345494
0.99 -0.0060950194195 -0.04545454545455 0.03061226
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Table A-3: Numerical Examples in Subsidy sBi and s
Q
i with b ∈ (−1, 0)
Complements
b sBi s
Q
i s
B
i − sQi
-0.01 1.00492468530147 0.99492531032336 0.009999375
-0.1 1.04216443549385 0.94279164930704 0.099372786
-0.3 1.071943930582940 0.78938676515098 0.282557165
...
...
...
...
-0.93 0.164515587009284 0.03520207063108 0.129313516
-0.94 0.121653250929093 0.02193886748370 0.099714383
-0.95 0.076813299068174 0.00900592186176 0.067807377
-0.96 0.029871825096847 -0.00349113843443 0.033362964
-0.97 -0.019306524564097 -0.01541279648572 -0.003893728
-0.98 -0.070869916495128 -0.02657115137601 -0.044298765
-0.99 -0.124980895219703 -0.03670727915761 -0.088273616
Table A-4: Comparison of Downstream Firm’s Profit under Subsidy Regime with b ∈ (−1, 1)
Substitutes Complements
b piCi − piBi b piCi − piBi
0.01 2.47522E-05 -0.01 2.52522E-05
0.1 0.002270283 -0.1 0.002773742
0.3 0.017185541 -0.3 0.031568513
0.5 0.041107564 -0.5 0.116223426
0.7 0.071037037 -0.7 0.323261479
0.9 0.107429154 -0.9 0.818064542
0.98 0.12787454 -0.98 0.679991622
0.99 0.131493861 -0.99 -0.058629134
Table A-5: Comparison of Upstream Firm’s Profit under Subsidy Regime with b ∈ (0, 1)
Substitutes
b uPi u
C
i u
Q
i u
B
i
0.01 0.49503719005722 0.49503719005720 0.49501243757580 0.49501243757579
0.1 0.45346135 0.453461329 0.451188062 0.451188054
0.3 0.377002 0.376988 0.359576 0.359571
0.5 0.319132 0.316105 0.273295 0.273175
0.7 0.268624 0.265814 0.188049 0.186945
0.9 0.246130 0.222954 0.095126 0.086730
0.99 0.284429 0.205484 0.043749 0.013600
Table A-6: Comparison of Upstream Firm’s Profit under Subsidy Regime with b ∈ (−1, 0)
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Complements
b uPi u
C
i u
Q
i u
B
i
-0.01 0.50503781509941 0.50503781509939 0.50501256258049 0.50501256258048
-0.1 0.554090602 0.554090575 0.551313537 0.551313528
-0.5 0.910949 0.909923 0.791031 0.790862
...
...
...
...
...
-0.74 1.422464 1.393378 0.988016 0.987834
b uPi u
C
i u
B
i u
Q
i
-0.75 1.457006 1.423716 0.998660 0.998556
-0.8 1.661585 1.595662 1.061217 1.057440
-0.9 2.369686 2.084756 1.310829 1.239123
-0.97 3.587310 2.624425 2.432307 1.536322
b uPi u
B
i u
C
i u
Q
i
-0.98 3.899701 3.249546 2.722565 1.612458
b uBi u
P
i u
C
i u
Q
i
-0.99 5.718314 4.281946 2.827527 1.705661

Proof of Proposition 4
To find endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities with Tables A-5 and A-6, we
need to consider the case of comparing each government’s social welfare as follows:
uCi − uPi = −b6µ2[D], where D = 1572864− 262144b− 5046272b2 + 851968b3 + 6602752b4 − 1118208b5
− 4515840b6 + 750592b7 + 1716224b8 − 266752b9 − 355008b10 + 45840b11 + 36408b12 − 2700b13 − 1519b14,
uQi − uBi = b6µ2[E], where E = 524288− 262144b− 2818048b2 + 1572864b3 + 6275072b4 − 3747840b5,
− 7604224b6 + 4750336b7 + 5492736b8 − 3539968b9 − 2417344b10 + 1593520b11 + 629832b12,
− 422612b13 − 87981b14 + 60031b15 + 4952b16 − 3452b17.
As in numerical examples, we obtain that uQi < u
B
i when the goods are complements with the range b ∈
(−1,−0.75]. 
Proof of Proposition 6
Comparing each government’s social welfare shows that
SWCi − SWPi = −b6µ2[F ] < 0, where F = 65536− 32768b− 180224b2 + 90112b3 + 186368b4
− 93696b5 − 88832b6 + 45056b7 + 18816b8 − 9568b9 − 1368b10 + 630b11 + 35b12,
SWQi − SWBi = −b6µ2[G] < (>)0, where G = 65536− 98304b− 212992b2 + 335872b3 + 296960b4
− 484864b5 − 233728b6 + 384256b7 + 113536b8 − 180960b9
− 34024b10 + 50670b11 + 5711b12 − 7781b13 − 400b14 + 500b15,
when b ∈ (0, 0.81][b ∈ (0.81, 1)] with substitutes. Moreover, when the goods are complements, we
obtain that SWQi < SW
B
i . Finally, we obtain that
SWBi − SWCi = −2b5(8− 3b2)(64− 16b− 64b2 + 8b3 + 17b4 − b5 − b7)µ2.
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The numerical analysis of Tables A-7 and A-8 shows that depending on the degree of imperfect
substitutability or complementarity, social welfare ranking is determined as follows:
Table A-7: Comparison of Social Welfare under Subsidy Regime with b ∈ (0, 1)
Substitutes
b SWPi SW
C
i SW
B
i SW
Q
i
0.01 0.2475185949513 0.2475185949512 0.247518594949704 0.247518594949700
0.1 0.226729957 0.226729953 0.226729813 0.226729810
0.3 0.188446727 0.186756934 0.188414585 0.188412570
0.5 0.157752744 0.157712381 0.157317636 0.157281029
0.7 0.132015121 0.131696285 0.129027381 0.128837277
0.8 0.120560048 0.199786413 0.113072259 0.112984393
0.81 0.119464592 0.118622011 0.111229702 0.111201296
b SWPi SW
C
i SW
Q
i SW
B
i
0.82 0.118378643 0.117461493 0.109363033 0.109312044
0.83 0.117302350 0.116304617 0.107462776 0.107307191
0.9 0.110045146 0.108288004 0.091608611 0.089115995
0.99 0.100622299 0.098086677 0.055939960 0.021120917
Table A-8: Comparison of Social Welfare under Subsidy Regime with b ∈ (−1, 0)
Complements
b SWBi SW
Q
i SW
P
i SW
C
i
-0.01 0.252518907472362 0.252518907472358 0.2525189074707840 0.2525189074707800
-0.1 0.277044599 0.277044594 0.277044423 0.277044419
-0.3 0.347449045 0.347443865 0.347389672 0.347384566
-0.5 0.455446647 0.455236927 0.454176881 0.453983083
-0.7 0.654359980 0.650032167 0.638942419 0.635722164
-0.9 1.346894007 1.193306524 1.059490125 1.012560301
-0.99 8.880753909 2.180951065 1.514824418 1.349702536

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